Telecommunications Sector For Armenia

Last revised Wednesday 1st November 2000

After a good start in the early 1990s, the Armenian telecom industry failed to fulfil its promise for several years. PSTN expansion has been given a new lease of life by OTE's purchase of 90% of telco Armentel in 1998. The Greek investor has planned large investments for several years to come and is also to boost cellular communications, via Armentel GSM. However, in mid-1999, OTE's purchase was jeopardised by a tax dispute with the government, which remains a dormant threat to the Greek investor. In 2000, the Telecoms Ministry said that Armentel had failed in its obligation to invest US$100m in Armenia's telephone system by March 2000, but extended the deadline until August 2000. That month the government and OTE signed a memorandum of understanding, although this is not expected to mean a quick resolution to the long-running problems.The poor state of the telecom infrastructure has hindered the development of value-added, data transmission, and multimedia services, despite growing know-how and interest. Given the need for quick network roll-outs, satellite and fixed-wireless technologies should play a key role for years to come. In the medium term, the weakness of the regulatory environment and the lack of liberalisation risks are having a negative impact on telecom development.

RISK FACTORS RATING WEIGHT PARTIAL
Overall country risk rating 3.31 25.00% 4.57
Regulatory environment 3.50 9.00% 1.84
Planned regulatory adjustments 2.00 4.00% 0.27
Obstacles to competition in fixed communication 5.00 3.50% 1.46
Obstacles to competition in mobile communications 5.00 3.50% 1.46
Obstacles to competition in equipment supply 3.00 3.50% 0.53
Obstacles to competition in satellite communications 3.00 2.25% 0.34
Obstacles to competition in cable communications 3.50 2.25% 0.46
Limitation of ownership in that industry 1.00 2.00% 0.03
Local attitude towards foreign investment in the industry 2.50 5.00% 0.52
RISK RATING (1 BEST, 5 WORST) 3.39 60.00% 3.39
 
OPPORTUNITY FACTORS
Taxation rates 3.00 3.00% 0.68
Local availability of skilled workforce 2.00 3.50% 0.35
Market potential (fixed line) 2.50 7.00% 1.09
Market potential (mobile) 1.00 7.00% 0.18
Market potential (equipment) 2.00 7.00% 0.70
Market potential (satellite) 3.00 4.50% 1.01
Local availability of credit 4.50 3.50% 1.77
Market potential (cable) 3.50 4.50% 1.38
OPPORTUNITY RATING (1 BEST, 5 WORST) 2.68 40.00% 2.68
 
OVERALL RATING (1 BEST, 5 WORST) 3.13  

 

 

Key Statistics and Facts

General

  1995 1996 1997 1998
Telecommunications Revenue (US$m) 21.1 49.3 41.8 47.9
as % of GDP 1.6 3.1 2.6 2.5
Telecommunications Investment (US$bn) 1.9 30.7 23.4 16.1
as % of GDP 0.1 1.9 1.4 0.8

Source: ITU

Human Resources

  1995 1996 1997 1998
Full-Time Telecoms Staff 9,300 9,500 8,817 8,415
Main Lines/Employee 62.2 61.0 64.4 66.1
Telecoms Revenue/Employee (US$) 2,268.8 5,189.5 4,740.8 5,692.2

Source: ITU

Industry Overview

Current Situation

Telecommunications is beginning to be an active sector in Armenia, due to the extreme need for modernisation and the rolling-out of new connections. At -2% in 1996-1997, fixed-network growth highlights the enormous tasks facing the country, which has inherited an obsolete and antiquated PSTN (public switched telephone network). For this reason, as in the rest of the region, the sector is to be one of the major investment opportunities. In the recent past, Armenia has suffered from the combined effects of a major earthquake (1988), a war with neighbouring Azerbaijan (which ended in 1994) and the economic fall-out of the on-going Russian economic crisis. However, it has been recovering steadily, and Russia’s crisis is not expected to fundamentally affect the underlying risk characteristics of the local telecommunications sector.

By the end of the USSR in 1991, Armenia had a regionally high fixed-line teledensity of 15.8%, compared to 16.6% in the Czech Republic, 10.9% in Hungary, 9.3% in Poland, and 15.0% in Russia. However, despite this small advance, the Armenian PSTN was beset with problems that reflected years, if not decades, of under-investment. Most of the equipment in place was antiquated, call quality was extremely poor, faults were frequent (76.6 per 100 main lines in 1994) and waiting time for a connection to the network extended into years. Furthermore, the country had no international links of its own - all international calls had to go through Moscow first.

Fixed-line Teledensity (Main Lines Per 100 People) 1975-1998

1975

1980

1985

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

6.7

9.8

12.7

15.7

15.8

15.7

15.6

15.6

15.4

15.3

15.0

15.7

Source: ITU 2000

After independence, Armenia installed one of the first international gateways in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) outside Russia. It was also the first country in the CIS to bring in a foreign partner to develop the PSTN (Trans World Telecom, in 1994). However, following these steps forward, the telecoms sector underwent several years of stagnation. Momentum has been renewed since 1998, when reforms generally speeded up under new President Robert Kocharian and the national monopoly was successfully privatised. This heralds new highs in telecoms investment, and many opportunities should arise, as the country plays catch-up for several years to come.

Cellular mobile communications were non-existent until 1996, when national telco Armentel launched its GSM 900 network. As a result, 1997 mobile subscriber growth reached a staggering, though artificial, 2000% in 1997. Paging also started up in 1996 and experienced 178% subscriber growth in 1997. Satellite services remain in their infancy, as does the CATV industry.

Data communications is a small sector but is already experiencing some competition. The internet market is comparatively small, and its tentative development has been hampered by the inadequacies and slow digitalisation of the PSTN.

Armenia’s role in the division of labour between the USSR’s republics was in part focused on the research and production of high-tech equipment. Before 1991, Armenia accounted for around 30% of the USSR’s whole military-industrial complex, in terms of space and defence production. The instrument-making sector primarily produced equipment connected with automation facilities, digital instruments and spare parts, components for laser systems, electric measuring instruments, and devices to automate, control and regulate technological operations. Other products included clocks and computer control systems, telecommunications equipment, radio equipment, domestic appliances, spare parts, and components. Several well-established research institutes served to underpin the sector. Thus, there is a significant - if declining - background of expertise in the high-tech industry. However, the growth of this sector of the economy was due to centralised investments under the Soviet Union, and was primarily intended for the production of defence-related equipment. The capital of know-how, research, experience and production capacities has yet to be effectively converted for civilian needs.

Potential Growth

Although Armenia emerged from the Soviet Union with by no means the least developed PSTN in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), there is a lot of expansion and development ahead. Teledensity has actually been reducing slightly since the fall of the USSR (December 1991), and remains at around 15.0%, which is far lower than the pan-European average (around 35%), well short of West European levels (nearer 50%), and even lower than Russia’s (18.3%). This insufficiency is compounded by the fact that the Armenian economy is beginning to emerge from a command system towards a liberal market with a growing private sector. After years of disruption and a very painful start to post-Communist transition, the economy cannot afford to be held back by an under-performing telecom infrastructure, especially given the country’s isolated geographic position, rugged terrain, and hopes to serve as an East-West transit territory.

The table below details the progression of GDP growth following independence and up to the present, giving some idea of the type of investment needed to give the expanding economy, which is recovering from severe blows, the connectivity it requires.

GDP Growth 1993-2000

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999 (e)

2000 (f)

-14.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.2 3.3 6.6

(e) estimate
(f) forecast
Source: EBRD

The cellular mobile market too, in due course, promises great potential. Cellular subscriber growth was an astounding 2000% in 1997, which was due to the late start-up of cellular services in 1996. Given on-going economic difficulties and the low base from which economic growth is rebounding, subscriber growth can be expected to flag once the small richer strata of the market have been serviced. However, in the medium term, there is no reason for it not to pick up.

Nevertheless, there is no denying the relatively small size of the Armenian market, which stood at 3,433,629 in mid-1997 with a population growth rate of -0.33% (1997). Another, shorter-term brake on investment opportunities is the low buying power of Armenian consumers (see table below): the average revenue per fixed line in 1997 stood at US$73.6, compared to per-line revenues of US$800 to US$1,000 in Western countries. The average monthly wage of a civil servant in April 1999 was just 14,300 dram (at the time US$26.50). Under plans to rebalance local tariffs upwards, local calls would end up amounting to 6.4% of a civil servant’s salary, compared to 0.72% in the UK and 0.73% in the US. This explains the controversial nature of tariff rebalancing (see Regulatory Environment).

GDP Per Capita 1993-2000

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1999 (e) 2000 (f)

125

173

342

422

432

500 488

(e) estimate
(f) forecast
Source: EBRD

Fixed-line (Voice)

1995 1996 1997 1998
Main Telephone Lines in Operation (m) 582,800 579,500 567,800 556,000
Main Telephone Lines Per 100 People 15.4 15.3 15.0 15.7
% of Digital Main Lines - - 9.5 11.7
Waiting List For Main Lines - 89,900 111,304 109,981

Source: ITU

Ownership

National telco Armentel is 90% owned by Greece’s OTE (Hellenic Organisation for Telecoms), whilst the state retains a 10% stake. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is expected to to grant telecoms monopoly Armentel a credit of US$40m, and to take a 10% stake for US$17.8bn. However, the Bank's representative in the country stressed in July 2000 that this would only be forthcoming after Armentel convinces the Telecoms Ministry of its ability to meet its obligations to invest US$100m.

Investment Obligations

As part of the US$142m 90% privatisation, OTE assumed Armentel’s US$43m in supplier credits and made commitments for Armentel to invest more than US$265m into the PSTN within five years, starting in 1999. In 1998, Armentel invested US$18m, and it was due to step this up to US$74m in 1999, US$57m in 2000, US$57m in 2001, US$43m in 2002, and US$33m in 2003. The other main commitments were:

  • Digitalisation of all Yerevan’s exchanges and 54% of exchanges in the country as a whole
  • 20% teledensity by 2003/2004.
  • Completion of a 45km fibre-optic ring in Yerevan.
  • Installation of 20,000km of fibre-optic cable, connecting 800 towns and villages to modern services.
  • Cutting of main line installation time to one week.

However, since mid-1999 the Telecoms Ministry has been expressing doubt over whether Armentel would meet its obligations:

Given (i) the disparities between rural and urban communications, (ii) the paucity of the legacy network and (iii) Armenia’s rugged topography, fixed wireless transmission and access technologies (wireless local loop) are set to play a major role in the development of the PSTN.

Monopoly

At the time of the deal with OTE, Armentel was given a monopoly over basic fixed-line services for 15 years, i.e., until 2013. However, the monopoly was challenged, and the Constitutional Court ruled that the Telecom Law’s article on the monopoly was unconstitutional. Armentel’s licence has not been called into question, but the issue has not yet been resolved. Other disputes have also arisen around Armentel (see Regulatory Environment). Perhaps the most fundamental is the issue of tariff rebalancing, which is highly sensitive in the context of the country’s economic hardships.

Background

In 1991, AT&T supplied the country with a 5ESS international gateway switch worth US$6m, whilst AT&T Network Systems financed a US$1m Intelsat Standard A earth station from US-based Satellite Transmission Systems (STS) for Armentel in order to transmit voice traffic between Armenia and North America/Europe. In 1994, Armentel contracted Comsat to upgrade its analogue Orbita II earth station and install a 15km digital microwave link between the 5ESS gateway and the digital toll exchange in the capital, Yerevan. International connections to other former republics of the USSR are by landline or microwave, and to other countries by satellite and leased connection through the Moscow international gateway switch.

Armentel was set up in 1994 as a joint venture between the Ministry of Communications (via Yerevan City Telephone and Armenian Republic Long-Distance) and the US’s Trans World Telecom (TWT). One of its main tasks was defined as replacing old lines with fibre-optic cables, and upgrading switching equipment. However, development of the network failed to take off. Whilst capacity has been growing slowly, the number of main lines has actually decreased slightly. Network digitalisation, too, has remained minimal. The rate stood at 13% in 1998, but most of the digital switches are in the capital, Yerevan, leaving the rest of the country with a largely unimproved network and digitalisation of around 5%. In 1996, Siemens stepped in by providing Armentel with tied credit worth US$75m until 2010. Part of the agreement was that Siemens would lay a 45km fibre-optic cable and four EWSD switches in Yerevan, as well as supplying equipment for Armentel’s mobile cellular and paging networks. The credit is to be repaid mostly from Armentel’s international long-distance revenues, but also in part by TWT.

Leading Players

  • Armentel

    Armentel was set up in 1994 as a joint venture between the Ministry of Communications (via Yerevan City Telephone and Armenian Republic Long-Distance) and the US’s Trans World Telecom (TWT). One of its main tasks was defined as replacing old lines with fibre-optic cables, and upgrading switching equipment. However, development of the network failed to take off. While capacity slowly grew, the number of main lines actually decreased slightly. Network digitalisation, too, remained minimal. The rate stood at 13% in 1998, but most of the digital switches were in the capital, Yerevan, leaving the rest of the country with a largely unimproved network and digitalisation of around 5%. In 1996, Siemens stepped in by providing Armentel with tied credit worth US$75m until 2010. Part of the agreement was that Siemens would lay a 45km fibre-optic cable and four EWSD switches in Yerevan, as well as supplying equipment for Armentel’s cellular mobile and paging networks. The credit is to be repaid mostly from Armentel’s international long-distance revenues, but also in part by TWT.

Following a new tender in late 1997, Armentel is now 90% owned by Greece’s OTE (Hellenic Organisation for Telecoms), whilst the state retains a 10% stake. In the near future, Greece Levantis Co. and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are both expected to become Armentel shareholders, thus reducing the size of OTE’s stake. The EBRD is set to take a stake before the end of 1999. However, OTE will remain in control of Armentel through the largest stake. As part of the US$142m 90% privatisation, OTE has made commitments for Armentel to invest more than US$265m into the PSTN within five years, starting in 1999. In 1998, Armentel had already invested US$18m, and it was due to step this up to US$74m in 1999, US$57m in 2000, US$57m in 2001, US$43m in 2002, and US$33m in 2003. However, in November 1999, Telecoms Minister Rouben Tonoyan expressed doubts over whether Armentel would fulfil its obligation to invest US$100m by March 2000. This has been disputed by the company. But, in January 2000, the Armenian Prosecutor General's Office instigated legal proceedings against the firm on the basis that OTE had exaggerated the level of the equipment invested, and that the domestic partner had diminished the value of its property. Tonoyan has in the past emphasised that the government's contract with OTE will not be cancelled. However, in January 2000 he allegedly relieved Kiriakos Khristodulidis, the Chief Executive of the fixed-line monopoly Armentel, of his post. According to local press reports, Telecoms Minister Ruben Tonoyan accused him of illegally occupying his post. Tonoyan reportedly added that all the decisions that Khristodulidis had made were also illegal. Soon after, OTE's board appointed Ioannis Lambrianos as the new Chief Executive of the telco.

In July 2000, the Telecoms Ministry stated that Armentel had only invested US$40m by mid-May 2000, but said that it would extend the deadline for the US$100m investment to September 2000, after which it will retain the right to withdraw the company's licence to offer communications services if the conditions are not met. Armentel Senior Managing Director Ioannis Lambrianos responded that he will achieve this by August 2000.

Commitments and targets for the next five years include the digitalisation of all of Yerevan’s exchanges and 54% of exchanges in the country as a whole, 20% teledensity by 2003/2004, the completion of a 45km fibre-optic ring in Yerevan, and the cutting of main line installation time to one week.

At the time of the deal with OTE, Armentel was given a monopoly over basic fixed-line services for 15 years, i.e. until 2013. However, the monopoly was challenged, and the Constitutional Court ruled that the Telecom Law’s article on the monopoly was unconstitutional. Director of PTO Armentel, Kyriakos Christodoulides, stated in November 1999 that the company would be prepared to compensate foreign strategic investor OTE for the loss of the company's monopoly statusArmentel’s licence has not been called into question, but the issue has not yet been resolved. Other disputes have also arisen around Armentel (see Regulatory Environment). Perhaps the most fundamental is the issue of tariff re-balancing, which is highly sensitive in the context of the country’s economic hardships. Nevertheless, Armentel continues to dominate the market, offering local, intercity, and international communications, as well as AT&T international long-distance connections.

In August 2000, the government and OTE signed a memorandum of understanding that suggests revision of OTE's licence in three main areas:

  • Commercial issues - including tariffs and services - presented by the company.
  • Technical issues, including the definition of the OTE's duties, which are not accurately reflected in the licence.
  • The question of the monopoly, which is of particular interest.

At the same time, the Justice Ministry suggested that OTE had abused its monopoly in a number of areas, by providing low-quality, expensive services. He suggested that the government would probably not force OTE to cut some of its charges, but await the conclusion of negotiations between the Greek company and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which is keen to invest - but only on the condition that the company's 15-year monopoly is shortened. The government says that its intends to organise a framework for relations between itself and OTE by 31 October 2000. However, this would appear to be highly optimistic.

Cable Communications

CATV

As part of the privatisation of 90% of Armentel to OTE, the national telco was granted a CATV licence. In January 1998, AATV Communications launched a MMDS multi-channel distributing system in the capital, Yerevan, initially offering 16 local and foreign TV channels. AATV is a joint venture between the Cable Television Centre of Armenia (40%) and the US’s FSU Cable Investment Corporation (60%). If only due to Armentel’s fixed-line monopoly, cable telephony looks unlikely to be on the cards for some time.

Leading Players

  • AATV

In January 1998, AATV Communications launched a MMDS multi-channel distribution system in the capital, Yerevan, initially offering 16 local and foreign TV channels. AATV is a joint venture between the Cable Television Centre of Armenia (40%) and the US’s FSU Cable Investment Corporation (60%).

Mobile

  1995 1996 1997 1998
Cellular Subs. 0 300 5,000 7,000
% digital - 100% 100% 100%
Cellular Penetration (%) - 0.008 0.1 0.2
Cellular Standard

GSM 900

Paging Subs. 0 180 500 613
Source: ITU

When Armentel was created  in 1994  as a joint venture between TWT and the state (Yerevan City Telephone and Armenian Republic Long-Distance), TWT was expected to help provide private wireless and satellite services. In 1996, Armentel’s digital GSM 900 network (known as Arm GSM, network code 28301, handset code ARMM01) was launched with equipment from Siemens, and it had grown by 2000% to 6,220 by the end of 1997. Arm GSM provides a range of supplementary services (e.g., call forward, call waiting, call hold, multiparty, call barring) and data services.

In 1998, when OTE purchased 90% of Armentel, the GSM network was given a 15-year monopoly on cellular mobile communications. However, in August 1998, the MC decided to reduce this period to five years under pressure from the EBRD, which had granted US$60m in credit to Armentel. However, this had not come into effect by November 1999, when US firms warned that the 15-year mobile monopoly would be an obstacle to Armenia joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Under a business plan presented to the government by OTE in early 1999, 94% of the national territory should be covered by the GSM network over the next three years. Subscriber growth should continue at impressive rates until the richer strata of Armenian society are saturated, at which point there should be a significant slowdown, due to the very limited buying power of most consumers. In the longer term, continuing fixed-line insufficiency should combine with economic recovery and the remoteness of parts of the country to increase the potential of the cellular market. Armentel announced in November 1999 that it had started to expand the country's cellular network in four directions: Masis-Artashat-Ararat, Metsamor-Armavir, Abovyan-Razdan-Sevan and Ashtarak-Tallin-Gyumri, and that a computer programme to service this larger cellular network had also been established.

As part of its 1996 tied credit to Armentel (see above Fixed-Line Communications), Siemens started supplying equipment for the telco’s GSM network, as well as for its paging network. The latter uses the ERMES standard. At the end of 1997, the network had 500 subscribers, up from 180 in its launch year of 1996.

Leading Players

  • Armentel

When Armentel was created  in 1994 as a joint venture between TWT and the state (Yerevan City Telephone and Armenian Republic Long-Distance), TWT was expected to help provide private wireless and satellite services. In 1996, Armentel’s digital GSM 900 network (known as Arm GSM, network code 28301, handset code ARMM01) was launched with equipment from Siemens, and it had grown by 2000% to 6,220 by the end of 1997. Arm GSM provides a range of supplementary services (e.g., call forward, call waiting, call hold, multiparty calls, call barring) and data services. In 1998, when OTE purchased 90% of Armentel, the GSM network was given a 15-year monopoly on cellular mobile communications. However, in August 1998, the MC decided to reduce this monopoly to five years, under pressure from the EBRD, which had granted US$60m in credit to Armentel. This issue had yet to be resolved by November 1999. Under a business plan presented to the government by OTE in early 1999, 94% of the national territory should be covered by the GSM network over the next three years. In November 1999, Armentel announced that it plans to construct base stations along the Masis-Artashat-Ararat and Mestamor-Armavir highways to expand its cellular network.

Armentel also runs an ERMES paging network fitted out by Siemens. At the end of 1997, the network had 500 subscribers - up from 180 in its launch year of 1996.

Satellite Communications

In the early 1990s, AT&T Network Systems financed a US$1m Intelsat Standard A earth station from US-based Satellite Transmission Systems (STS) for Armentel, in order to transmit voice traffic between Armenia and North America/Europe. Armentel also contracted Comsat to upgrade its analogue Orbita II earth station.

In March 1999, Arminco telecommunications company reached a preliminary agreement with Motorola’s Iridium to become the Armenian service-provider for its global system of communications via low-earth-orbiting satellites (LEOS). Arminco, which is also a leading internet provider, is to purchase the necessary equipment and receive a licence from the MC. Iridium will contribute organisational and technical assistance.

Leading Players

  • Armentel

In the early 1990s, AT&T Network Systems financed a US$1m Intelsat Standard A earth station from US-based Satellite Transmission Systems (STS) for Armentel, in order to transmit voice traffic between Armenia and North America/Europe. Armentel also contracted Comsat to upgrade its analogue Orbita II earth station. The signatory to Intelsat is the Ministry of Communications, but access is provided by Armentel.

Armentel is also one of the few internet service providers in the country, and its licence covers data communications and CATV. It is active in data communications.

  • Arminco

In March 1999, Arminco reached preliminary agreement with Motorola’s Iridium to become the Armenian service-provider for its global system of communications via low-earth-orbiting satellites (LEOs). Arminco was to purchase the necessary equipment and receive a licence from the MC. Iridium contributed organisational and technical assistance. However, the financial problems of Iridium caused the closure of its operations in 2000.

Data

The market for data communications is open. However, under the Telecom Law, all operators wishing to transmit data abroad still have to rent their international link from Armentel. In early 1998, a stand-off broke out between Arminco (an internet and data services provider) and Armentel. The MC intervened and ruled that Armentel had unduly attempted to obstruct Arminco’s entry into the data market. Global One, the worldwide venture between Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom and Sprint, also has a presence and offers global X.25 and global Enhanced Fax.

Internet

  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Estimated Modems in Use - - - 1,700 -
Internet Hosts 173 176 442 951 2313
Source: ITU

If only due to Armentel’s fixed-line monopoly, internet telephony looks unlikely to be on the cards for some time. Armenia established a permanent internet link in March 1994, although it has had non-permanent dial-up access since 1992. However, the paucity of the infrastructure - particularly the PSTN’s low digitalisation - hampers advances in internet connectivity. Local scientists and computer experts are taking a very active role in pushing for improvements, for instance bringing a NATO advanced networking conference to Yerevan in May 1997. The Armenian Internet Users’ Group (AmIUG) - a public organisation that unites major internet users - has established the Armenian Network Information Centre (AMNIC), the country’s official network information centre.

There are five main internet providers in Armenia: Armentel, the Yerevan Physics Institute, the National Academy of Sciences, the Armenian Information Company (Arminco), and Infocom (chosen by the MC as the national commercial data carrier). The landscape is not yet very competitive.

Leading Players

In 1994, Armenian-Russian joint venture Arminco (Armenian Information Company) became the country’s first internet service provider. In addition to access via the PSTN and separate communication channels, Arminco also provides its AIRNET network - a wireless radio-modem network that in 1998 had a speed of two megabits/second.

Arminco also provides web design services and hosts the Armenian Network Information Centre, which manages internet usage and runs the country’s national domain (‘AM’). In terms of data communications, it designs and installs LANs (local area networks), and elaborates turn-key projects. In early 1998, Arminco won an important dispute with Armentel. The latter was criticised by the MC for obstructing Arminco’s activities in data communications.

Apart from Arminco and Armentel, there are three other major internet service providers: Yerevan Physics Institute (primarily a scientific data carrier), the National Academy of Sciences (runs a scientific network connecting 42 research institutes), and Infocom. Infocom (www.amilink.net) is the international operator of the Armenian National Data Transfer Network (ArmPAC), and it provides data transfer networks (X.25, internet), fax, telegraph, and even telephone via Iskra-2 station.

Equipment

Leading Players

The main equipment providers in Armenia include: OTE, Hellascom (Greece), Siemens and AT&T and Lucent.

Regulatory Environment

The Ministry of Communications is the policy-maker and regulator for the industry, but its ownership of the PSTN was withdrawn in 1993. Telecoms regulation has so far been insufficient.

Ministry of Communications
28 Nalbandyan Str.
Yerevan 375010
Armenia
Tel: (374 2) 52-6632
Fax: (374 2) 15-1446
Email: mailto:ADerDFA@ptt.armernia.su

Government Strategy

The government’s strategy is officially favourable to liberalisation. Thus, the function of operator was quickly separated from that of policy-maker/regulator after the fall of the USSR. However, the need for clear regulation and the opening-up of the industry is taking longer to be recognised. Privatisation has been more of a priority than liberalisation, in the belief that foreign investment was the key to rapid improvements in the PSTN. Thus, whilst OTE has bought up 90% of Armentel, the licence includes a stifling 15-year monopoly on basic fixed-line services, as well as a similar monopoly on cellular communications (to be reduced to five years at an unspecified date) and a CATV licence, leaving little room for competition to strengthen. However, the OTE licence may have paved the way for further improvements. Thus, the Greek operator’s entry into the market made the need for clear regulation more pressing. A new Telecom Law came on stream in 1998/1999, laying the foundations for improvements in practice. Furthermore, the country’s parliament actively lobbied against Armentel’s 15-year monopoly and managed to secure a constitutional court ruling against it. The legislature’s motivation was not so much a disinterested commitment to open telecom markets as a combination of nationalism and consumer defence.

The monopoly issue, as well as the sensitive nature of tariff rebalancing and allegations of corruption surrounding the OTE takeover, led President Robert Kocharian to set up an investigative commission in early 1999.

The work of the presidential commission, which started on 3 March 1999, is divided along three lines: (i) from 1988 to 1994 (date of the launch of Armentel as a joint venture between the state and Trans World Telecom); (ii) from 1994 to 1997, examining alleged irregularities in the terms of TWT’s involvement; (iii) the period after 1997, when OTE won a tender for 90% of Armentel. In July 1999, worryingly, the commission was unofficially reported to have found irregularities in both the formation and the privatisation of Armentel. The finger was pointed at former Prime Minister Hrant Bagratian, who retaliated by reminding the commission that the OTE deal had gone through in July 1997, at which time the prime minister was none other than current President Robert Kocharian.

Apart from the controversies mentioned above, which reflect the lack of a transparent regulatory environment, there have also been a small number of legal disputes. The two main ones are as follows:

  • A dispute between Armentel and data/internet service provider Arminco was mediated by the MC in early 1998. The MC found that Armentel had unduly attempted to obstruct Arminco’s data transmission activities and stressed that, although alternative providers need to lease their long-distance connections from the telco, the data market is open.
  • The MC is involved in an on-going dispute with TWT and Armentel over alleged overdue tax payments on privatisation. In July 1999, the MC obtained a court order against the two companies. The dispute is ongoing and could, in a worst-case scenario, jeopardise OTE's investment strategy.

Important Regulations

A new telecoms law was passed in February 1998, but the regulatory environment still calls for major improvements. Specific regulatory characteristics of interest in Armenia include the following:

  • Regulator’s role: the MC has not had ownership of the PSTN for some time now, which has given it some independence. However, it still uncomfortably straddles for the roles of policy-maker and industry-wide regulator, which, given the amount of political controversy surrounding telecoms privatisation and liberalisation, is not a viable arrangement. In early 1999, Minister of Post and Telecommunications Artak Vardanian said that he expected an independent regulator to be set up by the end of 1999. Preparations are being made with the assistance of several European structures.
  • Monopolies: the government has been advocating the view that, at this stage of telecoms development, basic fixed-line services in Armenia remain a natural monopoly. However, this has been successfully challenged by legislators, and the situation is likely to evolve substantially in the coming months and years, with a shortening of Armentel’s 15-year monopoly a distinct possibility. Already in 1998, EBRD pressure helped to reduce Arm GSM’s cellular monopoly from 15 to five years, although this is not yet set in stone. Legislation clearly determining relations between the state and natural monopolists, as well as a consistent anti-monopolistic policy, are still lacking.
  • Tariffs: Tariff rebalancing and increases in line with costs are a necessary part of the overhaul of basic fixed-line services. However, this is a highly sensitive issue in Armenia, where, for indicative purposes, the average monthly salary of a civil servant is US$26.50 (Union of Armenian Consumers figure). Armentel’s tariff hikes have created an uproar. In April 1999, Armentel agreed not to raise tariffs for rural areas that have not yet felt PSTN improvements, since tariff hikes are supposed to be justified by the real cost and increased quality of service. This means that about one-third of main lines in 1999 are to escape the rises. In parallel, the MC is also pushing for Armentel to determine its tariffs in drams (the Armenian currency) rather than dollars, so as to shield consumers from exchange-rate fluctuations. In early 1999, the socially conscious parliament attempted to amend the Telecom Law in order to gain control over the setting of tariff limits. It failed, and this function remains the MC’s prerogative. In due course, the new independent regulator to be set up by the end of 1999 will take this over. In December 1999 the EBRD announced that it intends to launch a programme to create an independent regulator with the power to set tariffs. However, Ruben Tonoyan, the Telecoms Minister, does not seem to be sold on this idea.
  • Licensing: the MC is responsible for licensing telecoms services. Under the Telecom Law, all telecoms services are subject to licensing.
  • Cable and internet telephony: Both of these are implicitly made impossible by Armentel’s 15-year monopoly on basic telephony. The weak extent of CATV and internet access provision suggests that the issue will not rise to the top of the regulatory agenda for some time.
  • Data transmission services: Data transmission is an open market, subject to obtaining a licence and finding an arrangement with Armentel over the leasing of lines. In early 1998, Arminco won a ground-breaking dispute with Armentel over the latter’s obstruction in the field.
  • Quality of services and universal service: as a monopolist, Armentel is bound by its licence with the MC to honour a number of commitments and attain a number of targets (see Sector Organisation: Fixed-Line Communications). The digitalisation of the PSTN is Armentel’s number one priority. Tariff rises are being applied only in areas where digitalisation has been implemented and improved services can justify them. This provides an incentive for Armentel to close the market’s huge rural gap. Up to 2003, the telco plans to connect 800 villages to the digital network. Fixed wireless technologies are likely to play a key role in this roll-out.
  • Interconnection: interconnection remains a relatively minor issue, since Armentel has no fixed-line telephony competitors and also operates the country’s only cellular and paging networks. The law provides for unhindered interconnection with the PSTN for alternative data transmission providers, and this was upheld by the MC in early 1998’s dispute between Armentel and Arminco (see above).
  • Number portability/numbering: the regulatory environment does not as yet address these issues clearly.

Foreign Investment

Overview

The sale of a 90% stake to OTE in 1998 is testimony to the government’s openness to foreign investment into telecommunications. Back in 1993, the government’s move to form Armentel as a joint venture with the US’s Trans World Telecom was already groundbreaking by regional standards.

However, the controversy surrounding both of these privatisations (see Regulatory Environment) shows that there could be some improvement. There is a popular feeling among the political establishment that (i) foreign investors such as OTE are purely out to make a profit and are not sensitive to the social situation in Armenia when they set their tariffs, and that (ii) the state is selling its assets too cheaply. The way in which the Constitutional Court, following parliamentarians’ complaints, ruled against the 15-year monopoly clause in the Telecom Law is indicative of the possible obstacles to involvement.

There is no active opposition to FDI, either within the leadership or among the population at large, which, if anything, is accustomed to investment and assistance from the Armenian diaspora abroad, but the political environment is still fragile and a party system based on issues has not yet emerged. This creates a degree of uncertainty as to the specifics of telecoms development, even if the broad orientation towards liberalisation is unlikely to be questioned.

Structural Factors

Armentel already dominates the market, and its strong footing and monopoly make entry difficult. However, the data and CATV markets at least are open. Furthermore, the huge needs of the PSTN alone are set to create huge opportunities for equipment providers, financed by OTE. Manufacturers and installers of fixed wireless solutions should benefit particularly, given the need for a fast network roll-out reaching remote rural areas.

More generally, Armenia’s business environment is far from perfect. As elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, Armenia’s bloated bureaucracy needs to be reduced and streamlined in order to enhance the state’s administrative capacity and make it more conducive to business. In most cases, the bureaucracy is complicated and time-consuming. In some offices, such as the customs and tax inspectorates, foreign investors are liable to encounter over-zealousness. Corruption was also already widespread during the Soviet period. Since independence, levels have increased as a result of the country’s tumultuous transition and economic hardships. Demands for bribes and favours may be encountered at all levels of the state bureaucracy, making day-to-day business less fair and more difficult to navigate. Contacts are very important. Concepts such as the conflict of interests are absent from the legal system and business mentality. Unmonitored links between government and business have grown, and the corruption laws used are outdated adaptations of the old Soviet criminal code. Since late 1996, the government has openly sought to curb the rise of corruption. A number of top-level investigations have been launched, but tangible day-to-day improvements will take some time to be felt. The problem is unlikely to be resolved in the near future.

A background source of uncertainty that has been a brake to FDI is the dormant conflict with neighbouring Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, a mountainous ethnic-Armenian exclave inside Azerbaijan. A bloody war ended in 1995, but no settlement has since been reached. As a result of the war, Armenia faces embargoes from Azerbaijan and Turkey, and its traditional trade routes over land have been severely disrupted. The issue poses no day-to-day risk to foreign investors, but in the absence of a settlement, Nagorno Karabakh remains a time bomb: Armenia currently occupies 20% of Azeri territory, and the government recently accused Azerbaijan of plotting a resumption of hostilities.

Outlook

Trends

In the medium-to-long term, there is potential for sustained growth in all the sub-sectors of the industry:

  • The economy is moving towards a market economy. The business environment is still very far from perfect, but fast GDP growth, despite such external shocks as Russia’s crisis, should, if sustained by sound economic management, in due course lead to increases in telecoms consumption. Modernisation and expansion will be required in order to give the economy and society the connectivity that they need.
  • Although it is still far behind even the standards seen in Central Europe or the Baltic States, the regulatory environment for telecommunications has been evolving and is becoming clearer. There is currently some uncertainty over Armentel’s monopoly, and many issues still need to be clarified. The separation of policy-making from regulatory functions also lies ahead.
  • Some deadlines and targets have been set, and although issues of contention regarding privatisation/tariff rebalancing have come to the fore, they have so far been dealt with in a transparent way.

External Factors

As mentioned in Leading Players, WTO and European structures are having an indirect influence on the sector. The Armenian diaspora, too, is helping to shape transition, and has been an important source of foreign investment. Global technological change in the industry is having an impact: in many ways: Armenia is leapfrogging several stages of Western technological development, jumping straight from antiquated Soviet equipment to advanced international standards. This is both positive and, due to the costs of modern technology, a source of social strain.

Upcoming Developments

The main deadlines and challenges for the industry in the foreseeable future are:

1999:

  • Start of a new industry-wide regulator independent from the Ministry of Telecommunications
  • Report of the presidential commission on telecoms controversies (June/July).
  • EBRD and Levantis (Greece) buy stakes in Armentel.
  • Armentel investment target: US$74m.

2000:

  • Tariff increases continue as rural services expand. Armentel investment target: US$57m.

2001:

  • Armentel investment target: US$57m.

2002:

  • Armentel investment target: US$43m.

2003:

  • Armentel investment target: US$33m.
  • End of Armentel’s monopoly on cellular mobile communications.

2003/2004:

  • Targets: 20 main lines per 100 people, full digitalisation of Yerevan, 54% of country’s exchanges digitalised, main line waiting time down to one week.

2013:

  • End of Armentel’s monopoly on basic services (provided its licence is not revised).

 

Directory of Contacts

Armentel
22 Saryan Street
Yerevan 375002
Armenia
Tel: +374 2 520 915/549488/151 000/520 915
Fax: +374 2 151 001
http://www.armentel.com%20(under%20construction)/
 

Arminco
28 Isahakian Street
Yerevan 375009
Armenia
Tel: +374 2 526 326
Fax: +374 2 285 082
http://www.arminco.com/
 

Directory of Contacts
Ministry of Communications
28 Nalbandyan Str.
Yerevan 375010
Armenia
Tel: (374 2) 52-6632
Fax: (374 2) 15-1446
mailto:ADerDFA@ptt.armenia.su
 

Infocom
22 Saryan Street
Yerevan 375002
Armenia
Tel: +374 2 530 369
Fax: +374 2 528 856
http://www.amilink.net/
 




 

  This information has been provided by the World Markets Research Centre
World Markets Research Centre © 2000